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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

SALT LAKE COUNTY
COTTONWOOD SANITARY
DISTRICT, a public
entity,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.

Case No. 930294-CA

SANDY CITY, UTAH, a
municipal corporation of
the state of Utah,

Priority # 15

Defendant/Appellant
LAWRENCE P. NEMELKA, Trustee,
GORDON and VICKI HEINRICHS,
Intervenors.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal from a decision of the district court
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Sections 78-2-2Q") and -4 (as amended).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Appellee, Salt Lake County Cottonwood Sanitary District, ("District"), is a public
sewer improvement district organized pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 17A-1-301, et

seq.

It serves large portions of Sandy City, Big Cottonwood and Little Cottonwood

canyons, and unincorporated portions of Salt Lake County. To serve its public function,
the District must maintain an office for its administrative staff and a garage to house the
vehicles it uses to inspect new construction, respond to emergency calls and the routine
maintenance of the many miles of sewer lines in its system.
Early in 1991, the District, after consulting with the planning staff of Sandy City,
selected the site at issue for the location of its new office and garage complex. The District
applied for a conditional use permit to construct its facilities in an R-l-8 zone, which was
awarded by the Sandy City Planning Commission after a public hearing. The decision was
appealed by several citizens to the Sandy City Council, which overruled the decision of the
Planning Commission and revoked the conditional use permit.
Pursuant to Rule 65B(a) and (e), U.R.Civ.Pro., the District sought review in the
district court of a decision of Appellant's City Council reversing the decision of Sandy City's
Planning Commission to issue a conditional use permit. After briefing and oral argument
by the parties, the district court issued a memorandum decision ruling that the Sandy City
Council could not appoint itself as the body to hear appeals of conditional use permit
applications and that it therefore lacked authority to review the decision of the Planning
Commission.

The district court further ruled that since the decision of the Planning

Commission was supported by substantial evidence, that decision would be affirmed.

2

Following the appeal to this Court, the Sandy City Board of Adjustment entertained
an appeal of the Planning Commission decision. The Board of Adjustment affirmed the
decision of the Planning Commission to issue the conditional use permit, and after a second
appeal to the district court was dismissed, the Sandy City Planning and Building
Department used a building permit and the Appellee commenced construction.

Both the

district court and this Court have denied Appellant's request that the district court's
decision be stayed pending appeal.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

The District is a political subdivision of the State of Utah. (R. 2).

2.

On March 22, 1991, the District filed an application for a conditional use

permit to construct an office and vehicle garage facility on Highland Drive in Sandy City,
Utah. (R. 3).
3.

On May 16, 1991, the Sandy City Planning Commission granted the District

a conditional use permit. (R. 124-35).
4.

On July 16, 1991, the Sandy City Council overturned the ruling of the

Planning Commission and denied the conditional use permit. (R. 236). The District
thereafter appealed to the district court and on November 30, 1992, the district court issued

The Appellee reserves its right to assert that the subsequent proceeding conducted
by the Sandy City Board of Adjustment upholding the conditional use permit issued by the
Planning Commission is binding on Sandy City and entitles Appellee to proceed to
complete its development without interference.
3

a Memorandum Decision in which it ruled that the Sandy City ordinance, appointing the
City Council to hear appeals concerning the issuance of conditional use permits, was
invalid, as granting executive powers to a legislative body. (R. 363-71). Accordingly, the
district court issued its Judgment and Order reinstating the conditional use permit issued
by the Sandy City Planning Commission. (R. 376).
5.

On December 15, 1992, the Sandy City Mayor, City Attorney and members

of the Sandy City Council advised a citizens group which opposes the District's office
project construction, to appeal the District's conditional use permit to the Sandy City Board
of Adjustment. (See, Affidavit of R. Godfrey, Exhibit "B" to Appellee's Memorandum in
Opposition To Appellant's Motion For Stay Pending Appeal, f 3).
6.

On January 3, 1993, after being so advised and encouraged by the Mayor of

Sandy City, the Sandy City Council and the Sandy City Attorney, Robert Lunnen and others
appealed the Planning Commission's decision to grant the conditional use permit, to the
Sandy City Board of Adjustment under the provisions of Utah Code Ann. Sections 10-9407(2) and 10-9-704(2). (See, R. Godfrey Affid., OT 3 and 5). Sandy City allowed and
encouraged the appeal and approved the retaining of separate legal counsel to represent
and advise the Board of Adjustment in considering the appeal. Sandy City relied on the
appeal to the Board of Adjustment as a formal review and appeal which stayed the issuance
of a building permit to the District (Id., Sf 6).

4
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On January 13, 1993, Sandy City filed a Notice of Appeal, appealing the

district court's N ovember Ah 199 J IWcmoianiln n I - > mi
-:, 8.

' ?>').
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Oil Febi i Jai > 10 1993, the Sandy City Board of Adjustment considered the

appeals by Robert Lunnen and others of the Planning Commission's decision. On February
17, 1993, the Sandy t .. ^ ,.,, ^ Adjustment •.;„., .i.
Planning ("uniiiiissn

* i.v..

.•

^ s

.

.

i

^nditional use permit. (See, Appellee's Reply

Memorandum in Support of Suggestion of Mootness and Motion To Dismiss Appeal,
Exhibit "C" thereof). After the final decision of the buaiu ,., Adjustment on I ebnjarv IN,
19M3, ^.uuly ^'iiy
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auction of the office

complex, based oix the conditional use permit granted to the District by the Planning
Commission as affirmed by the Board of Adjustment. (See,
9.

(

•

. .

•

:

:

* .wuire)
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court, seeking review of the Board of Adjustment's decision to grant the application for a
conditional use permit. Lunnen v. Salt Lake County Cottonwood Sanitary District (( i\il
h o , V> tV'Jvl-

10.

i c\\ . .

!

.

In late April, 1993, the District entered into a construction contract with Culp

Construction Company for construction of the office complex. The District, uiu not, at that
lime, instil.

•. ..;

•

<ll 1 ( 1 ) .
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11.

On May 3, 1993, the Honorable Leslie Lewis issued a ruling granting the

District's Motion for Summary Judgment in Lunnen v. Salt Lake County Cottonwood
Sanitary District (Civil No. 930901603). (See, Appellee's Memorandum in Support of
Mootness and Motion To Dismiss Appeal, Exhibits "A" and "B" thereto).
12.

Based on the conditional use permit granted by the Sandy City Planning

Commission as affirmed by the Sandy City Board of Adjustment, and based on the building
permit issued by the City's Building Department and the dismissal of the appeal of the
Board of Adjustment's decision, the District issued a notice to proceed with construction
on May 3, 1993. Thereafter, the land was graded, excavations were made and footings and
foundations for the garage were completed. In addition, the District's contractor began
street excavation to bring storm drains and water, sewer and gas lines to the District's
property.

Since commencement of construction, the District's construction contract

obligates it in the amount of $1.4 million. (See, R. Godfrey Affid., W 10 and 11).
13.

Sandy City moved for an order staying the ruling below pending this appeal,

from both the district court and from this Court. Those motions were denied by orders
dated July 26 and August 12, 1993, respectively.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The court below did not err in overturning the decision of the Sandy City Council
based on a holding which harmonized the municipal conditional use appeals statute, Utah
Code Ann. Section 10-9-9, with the Optional Forms of Municipal Government Act, Utah
6

Code Ann. Section 10-3-1201, et seg.
required appellate review bianuc

Nor did the district court err by exercising the

•

• •. .
ARGUMENT
POINT I

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAI I HE
SANDY CITY COUNCIL LACKED THE AUTHORITY TO HEAR
APPEALS OF CONDITIONAL USE PERMIT APPLICATIONS
FROM THE PLANNING COMMISSION

A — The Municipal Conditional use Permit Appeals Statute Does Not Permit Sandy City
To Appoint The City Council As The Appellate Body To Hear Appeals From Thq
Planning Commission
Sandy City is a municipal corporation of the State of Utah which has selected the
separated powers, council-mayor form of government, also called the strong m a y i
isl:,f

The 1 - *

I'M in.

"'••!", die Sandy City Council, lacked

authority to hear an appeal from the Planning Commission's grant of a conditional use
permit, since hearing appeals of planning commission decisions \$ no; legislative LI nature,
an*. - - >.iinr* ' a

'M'.Miii.M'k^ii'iMhi'.

was based, principally, on two points of authority:

- / ' a s . This conclusion

ac I tah Supreme Court's decision

in Scherbel v. Salt Lake City Corp., 758 P.2d 897 vLUtii i ...u;. interpreting iwc upuonal
La-

-v/rra;,

!••:. A : _ m . N * .

;

1M

"

1

^M. et scqa and, 2)

the text of Utah Code Ann. Section 10-9-9(2) , enacted in 1989, after the Scherbel
decision.

In the Scherbel decision, the Utah Supreme Court considered a situation

where a landowner had applied for conceptual approval of plans for a development in a
historic district in Salt Lake City, a process akin to a request for a conditional use permit.
The Salt Lake City Planning Commission approved the landowner's plan and that decision
was appealed to the City Council, which reversed it. As the District has in the case at bar,
the landowner filed a petition for extraordinary relief.
The Utah Supreme Court held that zoning administration matters are an executive
function and reversed the district court, finding that the City Council could not hear the
appeal from the Planning Commission's decision. It based its ruling on its previous decision
in Martindale v. Anderson, 581 P.2d 1022 (Utah 1978), in which it had held that where a
municipality had adopted the council-mayor form of government permitted in the Optional
Forms of Municipal Government Act, Utah Code Ann. Sections 10-3-1201, et seg., there
is created ". . . two separate, independent and equal branches of municipal government."
U.C.A. § 10-3-1209. In Martindale, the Supreme Court held that approval o[ subdivision
plats is an executive function:
". . . [W]e cannot agree with the conclusion that the executive
powers of the municipality are to be in some way shared. Such
2
Section 10-9-9, along with the rest of Title 10, Chapter 10, was repealed and
replaced in 1991. Section 10-9-9 was replaced with Section 10-9-704.
8

a conclusion devises an anomalous form of government not
heretofore known and not intended by the Act.

When the Act is read in its entirety, and each provision thereof
is read in context with all of the others, and when viewed in the light
of the legislative history of municipal government in Utah, we are
compelled to conclude that it in fact provides for the absolute
separation of executive and legislative powers.

Simply stated, legislative powers are policy making powers, while
executive powers are policy execution powers. Legislative power, as
distinguished from executive power, is the authority to make laws, but
not to enforce them or appoint the agents charged with the duty to
make such enforcement. The latter are executive functions.

W hen viewed in the light of the foregoing concepts, the
approval of subdivisions in accordance with the rules, policies, and
procedures adopted by the legislative branch of municipal government
clearly appears to be a function of the executive branch.
581 P.2d 1022, 1027-28. (Emphasis supplied).
In Scherbci, n,, .-. .

,. •

.. ,.. AiartinuaJi. Matim*-

As in Martindale, we hold Lhat the authority to resolve zoning
disputes is properly an executive function rather than a legislative one.

"I hus, a city council under the council-mayor form of government may
not hear appeals from zoning decisions of a planning commission.
758 P.2d at 899.
9

Believing he was bound by the Supreme Court's holding in Scherbel, the court below
concluded that the Optional Forms of Municipal Government Act would not permit the
Sandy City Council to appoint itself to the executive function of hearing appeals from
conditional use applications to the Planning Commission. The district court wrote:
The Court concludes that the process of approving non-conforming
uses or variances is not substantively different from approving
conditional uses. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the Scherbel
decision is controlling in this case.
(R. 368).
Sandy City argues that an appeal of the Planning Commission decision on a
conditional use permit application does not involve a "zoning dispute" which, under the,
Scherbel decision, is a purely executive function. This contention is fatuous. Unlike a nonconforming use, a conditional use permit allows a use which is allowed, not forbidden by
the zoning ordinance, but which, because of the possibility that it could be incompatible in
some respects with the zoning scheme, requires a special permit and special conditions.
County of Imperial v. McDougal, 564 P.2d 14, 17 (Calif. 1977), application denied, 434 U.S.
899 (1977), appeal dismissed, 434 U.S. 944 (1977).
There can be no question that when a municipality's legislative body enacts or
amends a zoning ordinance, it is legislating:
. . . [W]hen a city council purports to act pursuant to its own zoning
ordinance to issue special use permits, it is not legislating, but is acting in its
administrative capacity.

10

Lund v. City of Tumwater, 472 P.2d 550, 553-54 (Wa.^h. A|,p. iy;u), review denied,
, 7K Wiisli ''I "'^ i W-uli Mi '"Ti

VJd

The action of the Sandy City Council being appealed in this case was not legislative
in nature. No legislation resulted, no ordinance was enacted and no generally-applicable
rules or t i. .

•'•

s

Development Code notes that the Planning Commission's decision was "appealed" to the
City Council, the Council took evidence and issued "findings of fact and conclusions of law"
(K. - - ..

I Jnder Sand) 's ordinance, whether a conditional use permit is appropriately granted
requires the application of general policies to specific facts and standards which are spelled
out i,. wic development L.uue itself
a spec-'i*

.

Applying a specific set of ah eady-enacted policies to

. ^rning * •:• — ,-'— nrnpcr'v cvvi ^

u

\

:inv stretch of the

imagination, be considered "legislation ; li .s an administrative function. The granting of
an application for a conUiuuiuu use permit is not a deviatiuii from the zoning uidnuince
:: i a "i e zonii lg" t I it is the administration of the ordinance, in compliance with it.
Kristensen v. City of Eugene Planning Commission, 544 P.2d 591, 593 (Ore. App. 1976).

I

II

III11!1" "I Aiiiit'iitliiiniif in Si 11 mi 10 (> (l Did Mini Overrule the Scherbel Decision.

Sandy City, while conceding that determination of zoning disputes is an executive,
rather than a legislative, function, urged the district court that its city council coL;ij, alter

the amendment of Section 10-9-9(2), appoint itself as the body to hear appeals of planning
commission decisions on conditional use permits. Judge Rigtrup dismissed this argument
as "simply untenable". (R. 367). The district court reasoned that the separation of powers
mandated by Section 10-3-1209 for Sandy City and the Supreme Court's unequivocal
holding in Scherbel that appeals from zoning decisions are an executive function not within
the province of a city council, required overturning the decision under review despite the
post-Scherbel amendment of Section 10-9-9.
Prior to its amendment in 1989, Utah Code Ann. Section 10-9-9 simply provided that
a municipality's Board of Adjustment was to be the appellate body for any person aggrieved
by a zoning decision. The 1989 amendment added sub-section (2), stating:
(2) Appeals from decisions of the planning and zoning
commission regarding conditional use permits shall be heard by the
board of adjustment unless the legislative body of the municipality by
ordinance has designated another body as the appellate body for those
matters.
(Emphasis supplied). Sandy City contends that the 1989 amendment to Section 10-9-9(2)
overruled the Scherbel decision and allows the legislative body of a municipality to hear
appeals of planning commission decisions on conditional use permits, even though the
Supreme Court in Scherbel clearly held this to be an executive, not a legislative, function.
However, it is almost too obvious to note that the 1989 amendment to Section 10-9-9(2)
only says that the legislative body may appoint "another body" to hear such appeals; it does
not say that the legislative body may appoint itself in a council-mayor form of government.
12

The Scherbel decision was based on the separation of powers required by Utah Code
Ann. Section 10-3-1209 of the Forms of Municipal Government Act, allocating functions
between a city's legislative and executive branches. Sandy City is asking this Court to infer
that a city council may appoint itself to hear planning commission conditional use permit
appeals, when the legislature could easily have said so, but did not.3 To ascribe the
meaning Sandy City wishes to impose on the 1989 amendment to Section 10-9-9(2) requires
that the Court find, by implication, an amendment or repeal of the Optional Forms of
Municipal Government Act, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Scherbel.
Amendments of statutes by implication, like repeals by implication, are not favored:
An implied amendment is an act which purports to be independent,
but which in substance alters, modifies or adds to a prior act. To be
effective, an amendment of a prior act ordinarily must be expressed.
Amendments by implication, like repeals by implication, are not
favored and will not be upheld in doubtful cases nor when they raise
constitutional questions. The legislature will not be held to have
changed a law it did not have under consideration while enacting a
later law, unless the terms of the subsequent act are so inconsistent
with the provisions of the prior law that they cannot stand together.
Sutherland, Statutes and Statutory Construction, Section 22.13 (4th ed.) (Emphasis
supplied). When the Utah Legislature amended Section 10-9-9(2), it did not say that the
legislative body of a municipality with a council-mayor form of government could, itself,

° Judge Ginsburg's observation in N.R.D.C. v. Hodel, 865 F.2d 288, 317 (D.C. Cir.
1988) applies as well to the Utah Legislature: "It should go without saying that the
National Legislature well knows how to amend a statute when it so desires."
13

hear appeals of conditional use permits from the planning commission, only that it could
appoint "another body as the appellate body for those matters." The 1989 amendment is
not inconsistent with the Scherbel decision unless the court interprets it to mean that in a
council-mayor form of government with separated powers the city council may appoint itself
to hear conditional use permit appeals.
This Court has previously observed:
As a general proposition, implied repeals are not favored and are
found only if there is a manifest inconsistency or conflict between the
earlier and later statutes.
Ellis v. Utah State Retirement Board, 757 P.2d 882, 884-85 (Utah App. 1988), affd, 783
P.2d 540 (Utah 1989). See also, State v. Sorensen, 617 P.2d 333, 336 (Utah 1980); Doe v.
Durtschi, 716 P.2d 1238, 1250 (Idaho 1986); T.R.F. v. Felan, 760 P.2d 906, 909 (Utah App.
1988). Accordingly, in the absence of "manifest inconsistency or conflict" between Sections
10-9-9(2) (as amended) and Section 10-3-1209, they must be harmonized. Only when the
two statutes are irreconcilably conflicting will the later statute be held to amend or repeal
the first in the absence of an express provision. Ellis v. Utah State Retirement Board,
supra. Here, the 1989 amendment to Section 10-9-9(2) and the separation of executive and
legislative powers required by the Optional Forms of Municipal Government Act can be
read quite consistently if the municipality's legislative body may not appoint itself to hear
conditional use permit appeals instead of the board of adjustment.

14

Sandy City's argument that the amendment to Section 10-9-9(2) means that any body
other than the planning commission may hear such appeals is an interpretation of the
statute, but it is not the only interpretation. Only a handful of municipalities in Utah have
adopted the council-mayor form of government since the Optional Forms Of Municipal
Government Act was enacted in 1977. In the remainder, of the state's cities and towns
there are no ". . .separate, independent, and equal branches of municipal government. . ."
U.C.A. § 10-3-1209. For the vast majority of Utah municipalities the Scherbel decision had
no effect.

Yet, Sandy City wishes us to accept, on faith, that the Legislature actually

considered the ramifications of the 1989 amendment to Section 10-9-9 would have on the
separation of powers mandated by the Optional Forms of Municipal Government Act in
municipalities adopting the council-mayor system and that the Legislature decided to permit
the legislating bodies of such communities to appoint themselves to decide planning
commission appeals on conditional use permits, an entirely executive function.

This

construction is incredible and results in a blatant inconsistency between statutes.
Since the 1989 amendment to Section 10-9-9(2) does not expressly abrogate
Section 10-3-1209, it must be construed consistently with the Scherbel decision holding that
a city council's function is limited to legislative matters and not executive or administrative
functions such as the review of zoning decisions.

This is consistent with rules of

construction disfavoring amendments or repeals by implication and requiring that later
statutes be harmonized with earlier enactments to maintain a consistent body of law.
15

POINT n
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN BASING ITS RULING
ON THE CITY COUNCIL'S LACK OF AUTHORITY TO HEAR
APPEALS OF CONDITIONAL USE PERMIT APPLICATIONS.
In Point I of Appellant's Brief, Sandy City argues that the district court erred
because it decided the case on a specific basis which the parties had not raised. However,
by this contention, Sandy City misconstrues the appellate nature of the district court's
inquiry under Rule 65B(e)(4).
The Sandy City Council conducted a public hearing at which it heard evidence from
the Planning Commission in support of the Commission's decision, received statements from
interested citizens, and from the District. (R. 139). The Council adopted a resolution
denying the permit and overruling the Planning Commission decision, including what it
termed "Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law". (R. 235).
This judicial or quasi-judicial action of the City Council is reviewable by the district
court pursuant to Rule 65B, U. R. Civ. Pro., through the appellate review procedure
approved by this Court in Davis County v. Clearfield City, 756 P.2d 704, 707 (Utah App.
1988), cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988). Specifically, the action of the city council
must be examined under the provisions of Rule 65(B)(e)(4), which states:
Where the challenged proceedings are judicial in nature, the court's
review shall not extend further than to determine whether the
respondent has regularly pursued its authority.

16

The cases cited by Sandy City stand for the proposition that a trial court may not
adjudicate issues not raised by the parties. But the district court in this case was reviewing
not trying the determination of the City Council. The district court does not try the issue
de novo, but applies the standard of review specified in Rule 65(B)(e)(4), Le^, whether the
city council "regularly pursued its authority". Under this rule, the district court has a duty
to determine, as it did in the case at bar, whether the action was illegal, regardless of
whether the issue is argued by the parties. Judge Rigtrup did not reach the issue of
whether the Sandy City Council's action was arbitrary and capricious because he decided
that its action was illegal, since Section 10-9-9(2) did not state that the city council could
be appointed to hear conditional use permit appeals from the planning commission and
could not do so without violence to the separation of powers established by Section 10-31209 of the Optional Forms of Municipal Government Act. This is not a situation where
a trier of fact "infringed upon counsel's role of advocacy", Girard v. Appleby, 660 P.2d 245,
247 (Utah 1983), but is a matter of an appellate tribunal exercising the specific standard
of review required by statute. In sum, the district court was justified, and required, to find
as it did, even though the specific question was not raised by the parties.
CONCLUSION
Sandy City's appeal teeters on a single point. It asks this Court to re-draft the
statute and rule that the insertion of a phrase in Section 10-9-9(2), that "another body" may
be substituted for the board of adjustment in deciding conditional use permit appeals,
17

enables the city council to appoint a legislative body, the city council itself, to fulfill this
purely executive function in contravention of the strict separation of powers required by an
earlier statute, the Optional Forms of Municipal Government Act. This contention is, as
the District Court put it, "simply untenable".
The District Court exercised the judgment required by Rule 65B and correctly ruled
that the Sandy City Council did not have the authority to vacate the District's conditional
use permit. That judgment should be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this &&> d a y of August, 1993.
PARSONS, DAVIES, KINGHORN & PETERS

18

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed in the U.S. Mails, postage prepaid, a copy
of the foregoing Brief of Appellee to the following this

day of August, 1993:

Clark Nielsen, Esq.
Stephen L. Henriod, Esq.
Henriod, Henriod & Nielsen
185 South State, # 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Richard S. Nemelka, Esq.
2046 East 4800 South, # 103
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117
PARSONS, DAVIES, KINGHORN & PETERS

rlk/pldgs/brief-ca.slc

19

ADDENDA

Addendum "A" ~

Memorandum Decision

Addendum "B" ~

Utah Code Ann. Section 10-3-1209

Addendum "C" ~

Utah Code Ann. Section 10-9-9

Addendum "D" -

Utah Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 65B(e)(2)(A) and (B)

20

ADDENDUM "A"

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

SALT LAKE COUNTY COTTONWOOD
SANITARY DISTRICT, a public
entity,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
CIVIL NO.

910905227

Plaintiff,
vs.
SANDY CITY, UTAH, a
municipal corporation of the
State of Utah,
Defendant,
LAWRENCE P. NEMELKA, Trustee,
GORDON and VICKI HEINRICHS,
Intervenors.

Plaintiff
seeks

by

Salt

its

Lake

County

Amended

Cottonwood

Complaint

Sanitary

herein

relief

District
from

a

determination made by the Sandy City Council on or about July
30,

1991 to reverse the decision

of the Sandy

City

Planning

Commission to issue plaintiff a conditional use permit.
relief

is

sought

pursuant

to

Rule

65D(e) (2) (A)

&

Said

(B) , Utah

Rules of Civil Procedure.
Plaintiff has moved for an Order reversing the decision of
the

Sandy

City

Council

and

reinstating

the

conditional

use
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permit

granted

by

the

PAGE TWO

Sandy

City

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Planning

Commission.

parties have submitted Memoranda on the issues.

The

Records of the

proceedings of the Sandy City Planning Commission and the Sandy
City Council have been submitted
Court

heard

oral

arguments

for the Court's review.

from

the

respective

The

parties.

Thereafter, the parties submitted to the Court for its decision
whether or not the Sandy City Council exceeded its authority or
acted arbitrarily and capriciously in reversing the decision of
the

Sandy

City

Planning

conditional use permit.
of the Sandy

Commission

to

issue

plaintiff

The Court has considered

City proceedings

and the Memoranda

the

a

records

submitted

by

the parties.

DISCUSSION
Plaintiff sought by its application to Sandy City to obtain
a

conditional

consisting

of

use permit

to

an

vehicle

office,

construct

an

garage

administrative
and

related

facility at 8620 South Highland Drive, Sandy, Utah.
several

hearings,

plaintiff's

the

proposed

Planning

facility

Commission

was

a

"public

site

parking
Following

determined
service,"

that
thus

qualifying it as a conditional use within the R-l-8 Residential
zone.

Sandy

City

Development

Code,

Section

15-7-5(c)(8).
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After prescribing
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a number
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of conditions, to which

plaintiff

agreed to be bound, the Sandy City Planning Commission approved
plaintiff's conditional use of the subject property on May 16,
1991.
Some of the residents of the area filed an appeal therefrom
with the Sandy City Counsel on June 3, 1991.
statute

controlling

appeals

from

decisions

The
of

applicable

planning

and
t

zoning commissions at that time was found in Section 10-9-9(2),
Utah

Code

Ann.

(1991

Cum

Supp.).

The

controlling

provision

which became effective April 24, 1989, provided:
Appeals from the decisions of the planning
and zoning commission regarding conditional use
permits shall be heard by the board of adjustment
unless the legislative body of the municipality
by ordinance has designated another body as the
appellate body
for those matters.
(Emphasis
added.)
The statute appears to have enabled the legislative body of a
municipality
however,

to designate

there

is

another

nothing

in

body

such

to hear

enablement

such appeals;
indicating

a

legislative intent to change or alter the powers exercisable by
a board of adjustment.

In effect, the statutory scheme simply

allows another body to act as the board of adjustment.
Sandy
itself

as

City
the

Council
appeals

by
body

its
in

Ordinance
such

cases.

15-23-7
A

copy

appointed
of

said
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ordinance

is

attached

PAGE FOUR

hereto

as
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"Attachment

A.11

Based

upon

said ordinance, the Sandy City Council then proceeded to handle
the appeal.
Subsection

(3) of the ordinance

permitted

the

hold public hearings or to conduct evidentiary

Council

review

to

outside

the Planning Commission record to determine whether:
(b) the proposed use would (i) influence patterns
of growth
adverse to the
integrity
of
the
comprehensive plan as implemented by the zoning
ordinance; . . . or (iii) undermine the health,
safety or welfare of the surrounding neighborhood
or community.
At the Council meeting of the Sandy
16, 1991, the Council received
Planner, who presented

Council

on July

input from Gil Avellar, Senior

a detailed

the prior approval process.

City

history

of the project

and

In addition, the Council received

significant comments from the public and permitted the response
of plaintiff.
On July 30, 1991 the Council voted to deny the conditional
use

authority

and

reverse

Planning Commission.
by the Council
County

conditional

earlier

decision

of

the

Resolution #91-60 C was entered

on October

Cottonwood

the

1, 1991 disapproving

Sanitary

District's

use of the subject property.

formally

the Salt

application
Apparently

of Fact and Conclusions of Law were also entered.

Sandy

Lake

for

a

Findings
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Counsel
identified
Sandy

for

defendant

the Sandy

City.

In
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in
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Sandy

City's

Memorandum

has

City Council as the legislative body

addition,

he points

out

that

Sandy

City

of
is

organized under the "optional" form of municipal government as
provided in Section 10-3-1201, et seq., Utah Code Ann.
"The authority

to resolve

zoning

disputes

is properly

executive function rather than a legislative one."
Salt

Lake

City

Corporation,

758

P.2d

897, 899

an

Scherbel v.
(Utah,

1988).

Counsel for Sandy City recognizes this, yet suggests that the
Utah

State

Legislature

amended

Section

10-9-9/2),

Utah

Code

Ann., to correct the effects of this decision and the decision
in Davis County v. Clearfield
. .
1988),

on

. .

municipalities

City, 756

P.2d

704

(Utah App.

.
using

1
conditional

uses.

This

position is simply untenable.
Section 10-3-1209, Utah Code Ann., provides that:
The optional form of government known as the
council-mayor form vests the government of a
municipality
which
adopts this
form
in
two
separate, independent, and equal branches of
municipal
government;
the
executive
branch
consisting of a mayor and the administrative
departments and officers; and the legislative
branch
consisting
of
a
municipal
council.
(Emphasis added.)

1

Although counsel for Sandy City acknowledged that
Scherbel stood for the proposition that the resolving of zoning
disputes involves an executive function, no mention was made of
the fundamental separation of powers problem addressed in that
case and involved in this case.
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The

Utah

Supreme

Court

PAGE SIX

at

page
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899

in

Scherbel,

supra,

concluded that, "A city council under the council-mayor form of
government

may

not

hear

planning commission,"

appeals

from

zoning

decisions

of

a

The Court concludes that the process of

approving non-conforming uses or variances is not substantively
different
Court

from

approving

concludes

conditional

that the Scherbel

uses.

decision

Accordingly,

the

is controlling

in

this case.
A review of the various Sandy City records discloses that
there was substantial basis for the approval of the conditional
use permit by the Sandy City Planning Commission
the

Salt

Lake

Cottonwood

Sanitary

Council being without authority

District,

in favor of

The

Sandy

to review planning

City

commission

decisions, the grant of the conditional use permit by the Sandy
City Planning Commission should be reinstated.
Based

upon

the

foregoing,

the

Court

orders

entry

of

an

order reversing the decision of the Sandy City Council embodied
in Resolution

#91-60C

entered

October

1,

1991, affirming

the

decision of the Sandy City Planning Commission of May 16, 1991
and ordering the planning

commission to issue the

use

County

permit

forthwith.

to

Salt

Lake

Cottonwood

conditional

Sanitary

District
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Counsel for plaintiff shall submit an appropriate
the rulings herein contained.
Dated this

day of November, 1992.

K
KENNETH RIGTRUP
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

Order on
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy
of

the

foregoing

Memorandum

Decision,

to

the

following,

this _ U _ d a y of November, 1992:

Gerald H. Kinghorn
Bill Thomas Peters
Attorneys for Plaintiff
9 Exchange Place, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
David L. Church
Attorney for Defendant
51 East 400 South, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Richard S. Nemelka
Attorney for Intervenors
2046 East 4800 South, Suite 103
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117
Walter R. Miller
Sandy City Attorney
440 East 8680 South
Sandy, Utah 84070
Sandy City Council
440 East 8680 South
Sandy, Utah 84070
Sandy City Planning Commission
440 East 8680 South
Sandy, Utah 84070
Salt Lake County Cottonwood
Sanitary District
1400 East 7000 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121
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15-23i-2 3 r-y^ -- CONDITIONAL USE APPEALS

(1) All appeals from decisions of the Planning Commission
regarding conditional use permits shall be heard by the City
Council.
(2) Except as provided in subsection (3), review of
decisions of the Planning Commission shall be confined to the
administrative record developed by the Commission,
(3) The City Council may hold a public hearing or permit an
evidentiary review outside the Planning Commission record to
determine whether:
(a) An alleged procedural irregularity has occurred that
does not appear in the record.
(b) The proposed use would (i) influence patterns of growth
adverse to the integrity cf the comprehensive plan as
implemented by the zoning ordinance; (ii) have a long-term
detrimental impact on City resources available for capital
improvements or urban services; or (iii) undermine the
health, safety or welfare of the surrounding neighborhood or
community.
(4) Hearings may be held by the City Council itself, cr by
any Council member, hearing examiner, or agent appointed by the

(5) The City Ccuncil may overrule any approval or
disapproval by the Planning Commission, or any conditions
imposedIt may approve or deny the conditional use, impose
additional conditions thereon, or remand the appeal to the
Planning Commission for further consideration.
(6)

Any decision by the City Ccuncil approving cr denying

ATTACHMENT "A"

ADDENDUM "B"

10-3-1209.

Council-mayor and council-manager
form defined.
The optional form of government known as the
council-mayor form vests the government of a municipality which adopts this form in two separate, independent, and equal branches of municipal government; the executive branch consisting of a mayor and
the administrative departments and officers; and the
legislative branch consisting of a municipal council.
The optional form known as the coimcil-manager
form vests the government of the municipality in a
municipal council which shall be deemed the governing body of the municipality and a manager appointed by the council.
1979

ADDENDUM "C

10-9-9. Appeals to board — Time — Persons entitled — Transmission of papers — Appeals from planning and zoning commission.
(1) Appeals to the board- of adjustment may' be
taken by any person aggrieved or. by any .officer,'department, board, or bureau: of the municipality affected by any decision of the administrative officer.
The appeal shall be taken within a reasonable time,
as provided by the rules of the board,: by filing, with
the officer from whom the appeal is taken and*with
the board of adjustment a notice of appeal specifying
the grounds for the appeal. The officer from whom the
appeal is taken shall immediately transmit to the
board of adjustment all the papers constituting the
record upon which the action appealed from was
taken.
(2) Appeals from decisions of the planning and zoning commission regarding conditional use permits (
shall be heard by the board of adjustment unless the 1
legislative body of the municipality by ordinance has*
designated another body as the appellate body for
those matters.
1989

ADDENDUM "D"

Rule 65B

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

paragraph after receiving notice of the person's claim. A petition filed by
a person other than the attorney general under this paragraph shall be
brought in the name of the petitioner, and the petition shall be accompanied by an undertaking with sufficient sureties to pay any judgment for
costs and damages t h a t may be recovered against the petitioner in the
proceeding. The sureties shall be in the form for bonds on appeal provided
for in Rule 73.
(2) Grounds for relief. Appropriate relief may be granted: (A) where a
person usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public
office, whether civil or military, a franchise, or an office in a corporation
created by the authority of the state of Utah; (B) where a public officer
does or permits any act t h a t results in a forfeiture of the office; (C) where
persons act as a corporation in the state of Utah without being legally
incorporated; (D) where any corporation has violated the laws of the state
of U t a h relating to the creation, alteration or renewal of corporations; or
(E) where any corporation has forfeited or misused its corporate rights,
privileges or franchises.
(3) Proceedings o n the petition. On the filing of a petition, the court
may require that notice be given to adverse parties before issuing a hearing order, or may issue a hearing order requiring the adverse party to
appear at the hearing on the merits. The court may also grant temporary
relief in accordance with the terms of Rule 65A.
(e), Wrongful use of judicial authority or failure to comply w i t h duty.
(1) Who m a y petition. A person aggrieved or whose interests are
threatened by any of the acts enumerated in this paragraph (e) may
petition the court for relief.
(2) Grounds for relief. Appropriate relief may be granted: (A) where
an inferior court, administrative agency, or officer exercising judicial
functions has exceeded its jurisdiction or abused its discretion; (B) where
an inferior court, administrative agency, corporation or person has failed
to perform an act required by law as a duty of office, trust or station; or
(C) where an inferior court, administrative agency, corporation or person
has refused the petitioner the use or enjoyment of a right or office to
which the petitioner is entitled.
(3) P r o c e e d i n g s on t h e petition. On the filing of a petition, the court
may require that notice be given to adverse parties before issuing a hearing order, or may issue a hearing order requiring the adverse party to
appear at the hearing on the merits. The court may direct the inferior
court, administrative agency, officer, corporation or other person named
as respondent to deliver to the court a transcript or other record of the
proceedings. The court may also grant temporary relief in accordance
with the terms of Rule 65A.
(4) S c o p e of review. Where the challenged proceedings are judicial in
nature, the court's review shall not extend further t h a n to determine
whether the respoudent has regularly pursued its authority.
(Amended effective September 1, 1991.)

